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A B S T R A C T
The incorporation of National Public Management (npm) in Brazil has challenged 
the centralizing role of the national government as a policy creator, due to the 
npm decentralized structure in implementing administrative policy. The author 
hypothesizes that the introduction of such a decentralized model into the Brazilian 
national government creates a contradiction to its traditional centralizing role 
as a policy creator, and forces it to take on the role of a policy manager. This 
hypothesis is backed up by a research design that relies on process tracing analysis 
of primary and secondary sources on Brazilian administrative policy in the npm 
model, and on documentation of neoliberal pressures from the international 
community to demonstrate the convergence of political discourse. The following 
analysis will demonstrate the pressure from these political forces on the Brazilian 
national government to maintain its political legitimacy. This pressure has led 
to re-centralization by the state in the domestic administrative policy discourse, 
while the implementation of the npm model and thereof resulting neoliberal 
policies introduced by the international community have created an administrative 
decentralized environment. Consequently, the implementation of the npm 
model has led to fragmentation domestically and challenged the policy agenda 
of the national government in the centralization of the decision-making process 
around fiscal and political agendas, while decentralizing the implementation 
of administrative policies following the npm model with a neoliberal agenda. 
These findings suggest a need to examine the role of the national government as 
“Gatekeeper”, particularly in regards to changes toward institutional relationships.
KEY WORDS: Gatekeeper, national government, 
National Public Management (npm), Brazil.
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R E S U M E N
La introducción del modelo de Gestión Pública Nacional (gnp) en Brasil ha representado 
un desafío para el carácter centralizador del gobierno nacional, considerando la 
naturaleza descentralizadora que supone dicho modelo para la implementación de 
la política administrativa. Este trabajo plantea la hipótesis de que la introducción de 
un modelo descentralizado en el gobierno brasileño genera una contradicción para el 
ejercicio de su papel tradicional como creador de políticas centralizadas, lo cual obliga 
al gobierno de este país a asumir un nuevo rol como administrador de políticas. Esta 
hipótesis se soporta en un diseño metodológico basado en el análisis del rastreo de 
proceso de fuentes primarias y secundarias acerca de la política administrativa propuesta 
así como en documentación sobre la presión neoliberal ejercida por la comunidad 
internacional para demostrar la convergencia del discurso político. El siguiente análisis 
demostrará la presión de tales fuerzas políticas sobre el gobierno brasileño para 
mantener su legitimidad política, lo cual ha llevado a la recentralización del Estado en su 
discurso sobre la política administrativa nacional. Por otro lado, la adopción del modelo 
gnp y de las políticas neoliberales introducidas por la comunidad internacional, han 
propiciado un entorno administrativo de carácter descentralizado. En consecuencia, 
la implementación del modelo ha conducido a una polarización interna, poniendo en 
riesgo la agenda política que busca la centralización del proceso de toma de decisiones 
en torno a asuntos fiscales y de política pública; sin embargo, a su vez, ha generado 
la descentralización en la adopción de políticas administrativas de base neoliberal. 
Estos hallazgos demuestran la necesidad de examinar el papel del gobierno nacional 
como Gatekeeper, particularmente en lo que respecta a cambios en las relaciones 
institucionales.
KEY WORDS: Gatekeeper, Gobierno nacional, Gestión Pública 
Nacional (GPN), Brasil.
R E S U M O
A introdução do modelo de Gestão Pública Nacional (gpn) no Brasil representa um 
desafio para o caráter centralizador do governo nacional, considerando a natureza 
descentralizadora que esse modelo supõe para a implantação da política administrativa. 
Este trabalho propõe a hipótese de que a introdução de um modelo descentralizado 
no governo brasileiro gera uma contradição para o exercício de seu papel tradicional 
como criador de políticas centralizadas, o que obriga o governo desse país a assumir um 
novo papel como administrador de políticas. Essa hipótese está apoiada num desenho 
metodológico baseado na análise do rastreamento de processo de fontes primárias 
e secundárias sobre a política administrativa proposta pelo modelo, bem como em 
documentação sobre a pressão neoliberal exercida pela comunidade internacional 
para demonstrar a convergência do discurso político. Esta análise demonstrará a 
pressão dessas forças políticas sobre o governo brasileiro para manter sua legitimidade 
política, o que tem levado à recentralização do Estado em seu discurso sobre a política 
administrativa nacional. Por outro lado, a adoção do modelo gpn e das políticas 
neoliberais introduzidas pela comunidade internacional tem propiciado um contexto 
administrativo de caráter descentralizado. Em consequência, a implantação do modelo 
tem conduzido a uma polarização interna, colocando em risco a agenda política que 
busca a centralização do processo de tomada de decisões em torno de assuntos fiscais e 
de política pública; contudo, por sua vez, tem gerado a descentralização na adoção de 
políticas administrativas de base neoliberal. Esses achados demonstram a necessidade 
de examinar o papel do governo nacional como Gatekeeper, particularmente no que diz 
respeito a mudanças nas relações institucionais.
PALAVR AS-CHAVE: Brasil, Gestão Pública Nacional (gpn), 
Gatekeeper, governo nacional.
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Introduction 
In Latin America, Brazil has gone further than other countries 
in the implementation of National Public Management (npm) 
reform. Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico and Colombia have advanced 
in the general procedural reform only, for example, by creating 
the standardization of public competition systems and personal 
confidence criteria (Bresser-Pereira, 1998; Silva-Dias et al., 2013). In 
Brazil, the implementation of npm reform has taken a dialectical 
functionalism approach in policy interactions between the Brazilian 
national government and supranational organizations, such as 
the International Monetary Fund (imf) and the World Bank 
(Fadul & de-Souza, 2005). The aim of functionalism is to address 
organizational and managerial difficulties in the public sector by 
engaging in the process of reform through the transformation 
of administrative structures. Above and beyond, npm reform 
has applied the neoliberal strategy of decentralization to the 
administrative structure of the state, with the subsequent outcome 
of democratization as evidenced in the adoption of procedures 
such as diplomacy and healthcare in specific jurisdictions. The 
ability to implement administrative policy in a pluralistic, political 
and institutional environment influences legislative developments 
regarding policy reform towards the npm model. This external 
impact of npm on Brazil provides an advantage for the adoption of 
its role as “Gatekeeper”1.
1  For more information on npm reforms in Brazil see Oszlak (2001).
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 In the “Gatekeeper”, the state uses its political power 
and maintains legitimacy through the following mechanisms: 
1) capturing most of the gains from capitalism; 2) keeping the size of 
the winning coalitions small; and 3) retaining a monopoly over the 
transfer of gains for the members of its winning coalitions (Corrales, 
2004). The foundation for the definition of the “Gatekeeper” is the 
existence of a coalition of governmental elites in the state with the 
authority to make binding decisions and redistribute administrative 
resources to society by monopolizing the transfer of gains. Despite 
these reforms, the author feels the introduction of npm into the 
Brazilian state also comes with its downsides, where governmental 
elites gain access to create personal wealth through bribery 
(Balbinotto-Neto & Garcia, 2006; Matias-Pereira, 2005, 2010, 2013, 
2014; Svensson, 2005). In particular, it has placed constraints on the 
national government in implementing administrative reform as this 
has created winners and losers who challenge the political actions of 
the national government. 
The purpose of this review is to investigate factors that have led 
to the role of the Brazilian national government as “Gatekeeper”, 
thereby causing an increasingly abandonment of its traditional role 
as policy maker, and assuming the role of a policy manager. The 
following question is used as the basis of the study: What is the effect 
of the incorporation of npm on the Brazilian national government’s 
role as “Gatekeeper”? 
This analysis hypothesizes that the adoption of npm and 
decentralized administrative policy by the Brazilian national 
government challenges the centralizing role of the state by allowing 
elites to extract resources for their own gain. Special attention will 
be given to the external forces of supranational factors and their 
neoliberal administrative policy agendas on the reconfiguration 
of the role of the government as “Gatekeeper”, a role that the 
government has been pressured to take on in an effort to preserve, 
secure, and enhance its legitimacy. While the aim of this review is 
not to address the hegemonic role of Brazil and its possible rise or 
fall in the new world order2, it is the agenda to illustrate political 
2  See, for example, Kennedy (1989), who illustrates the historical cyclical nature of the 
rise and fall of countries.
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power from the international community to invoke political change 
on the national level in Brazil.3 
In analyzing the politics resulting  in the implementation of 
npm as a driving force in Brazil’s transformation of the state into a 
“Gatekeeper”, the author’s research is based on the theory “Islands 
of Persuasion and Discourse” developed by Nicole Deitelhoff (2009). 
In this context, the Brazilian state competes for autonomy with 
federal institutions with the goal of distributing goods through an 
npm decentralized structure. In order to understand the political 
dynamics of the relationship between npm and the Brazilian state, 
this analysis is based on the examination of secondary sources 
and on process tracing of primary texts. These sources show that, 
with the emergence of npm policy in the domestic economy, the 
national government has been able to marginalize other actors 
(e.g. financial institutions, the business sector, regulatory agencies) 
in the government, thereby demonstrating the political power of 
governmental elites. Thus, the “Gatekeeper” is not just important 
because it shapes political outcomes, but because it demonstrates 
prior conflicts between institutions and actors. These conflicts have 
manifested themselves in the spending of energy, resources and 
political capital by governmental elites, leading to the design of the 
“Gatekeeper”. As such, these conflicts demonstrate the importance 
of this study and are the basis for its justification. Furthermore, by 
focusing on the “Gatekeeper” in its struggle for political power to 
maintain a monopoly of bureaucracy in a decentralized structure, 
this analysis goes beyond policy and, thereby, expands on current 
literature which merely analyzes the state and administrative 
policy (Abrucio, 2007; Bresser-Pereira, 1998; Matias-Pereira, 2010, 
2013, 2014). It will also be shown in this review that multilateral 
agreements between partner countries and Brazil’s federalist 
structure form a conflictual relationship between governmental 
structures and, thus, constitute internal conditions leading to the 
evolvement of the Brazilian national government as “Gatekeeper”. 
Finally, it will be described how the effects of npm influence the role 
of the Brazilian national government as “Gatekeeper” and policy 
3  See, for example, Posner (2014), who demonstrates an institutional perspective 
of countries and their political power and the changing dynamics of power in the 
international community.
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manager. This political shift in power from policy maker to policy 
manager has changed the dynamics in policy reforms and political 
economy priorities, the result of which is a competitive political 
environment between international institutions to expand on 
neoliberal policy by reaching out to other state and nonstate actors 
such as international organizations and domestic institutions.
Brazil as the “Gatekeeper” State: 
Neoliberalism and npm 
For greater political legitimacy, a pluralistic political environment 
in Brazil pressures the “Gatekeeper” to take on the role of policy 
manager between international and domestic interests. In this 
context, political legitimacy is defined as the people’s recognition 
and acceptance of the validity of a system and its rulers (Lipset, 
1959). Political legitimacy is enhanced through the adoption of 
international norms, allowing the state to promote the practice of 
rule of law, accountability, transparency, and Human Rights. This is 
enforced by nonstate actors (ngos and civil society) who pressure for 
an agenda set by public interest to counter interests of state actors, 
who support an economic policy that favors a neo-liberal trade and 
investment agenda. At the same time, in Brazil, this conflictual 
discourse between nonstate and state actors assures greater 
legitimacy in institutional relationships because both actors have to 
come together in order to develop agreements on the functionality 
of neo-liberal policy. At this point, the national government takes on 
the functional role as policy manager in the form of “Gatekeeper”.
The “Gatekeeper” concept was chosen for this analysis of 
the Brazilian national government to illustrate the authority 
and political power in maintaining npm policy and its political 
consequences. As a result, the adoption of npm leads to alliances of 
domination between the state and governmental elites that allow 
the consolidation of power through self-interest (Rueschemeyer 
& Evans, 1985). This permits the coalition in the “Gatekeeper” to 
create a unified political agenda for governmental elites through 
the redistribution of administrative resources to resist conflict 
from dominating interests. The tension between governmental 
elites, bureaucratic networks and society causes the state to be an 
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actor that exhibits social dominance out of self-interest (Cardoso 
& Faletto, 1979). Therefore, in Brazil, the “Gatekeeper” maintains 
sovereignty and facilitates governmental elites and coalitions to 
undertake the role of the state. In the case of the state and npm, it 
is the redistribution of administrative resources and the availability 
of services to its citizens what facilitates legitimacy between the 
two entities.
After two decades of military rule, social regional disparity 
pressured the legislature to change the 1998 Brazilian Federal 
Constitution toward increasing competency to the federal states 
for more legislative power (República Federativa do Brasil, 2014a; 
Samuels & Abrucio, 2000). For example, in the state of Maranhão, 
the reform agenda proposed through a Complementary Act and 
ratified in 2003 has given subnational governments more autonomy 
over regulatory policy. The intention of the amendment was to 
create greater efficiency in implementing policy to conform to 
the incorporation of neoliberal economic reforms, as a response 
to pressure from the international community toward developing 
countries. 
The incorporation of neoliberal reforms in Brazil aims at 
a “Managerialism” approach to complement a “market-based 
model”. Managerialism within npm is defined as a framework 
of norms and tools based on approaches to solve economic and 
social problems (Imasato, Martins & Pieranti, 2011). The aim of 
Managerialism reform has been to introduce welfare services, 
privatization, deregulation and decentralization, which has led to 
the national government’s role as “Gatekeeper”. This is excacerbated 
by international pressures which have forced Brazilian technocrats 
and bureaucracies to conform to decentralized legislative standards 
due to the inefficiencies in providing service to civil society. 
Administrative reforms of decentralization have limited effects on 
attaining policy outcome. Intentions to reform the political structure 
to a decentralized model are based on resources and processes 
of efficiencies. To facilitate efficiencies, scholarly discussions 
in Brazil on administrative decentralization have pointed out 
existing inefficiencies on a macro level in an effort to address them 
(Andrews, Comini & Vieira, 1999; Bresser-Pereira, 1997; Diniz, 
2000). 
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npm as a market-based management model is based on the 
relationship between experts and political bureaucrats. The aim 
is to give experts greater discretion over policy reform and to 
provide greater services to its citizens. Above and beyond, the 
implementation of npm policies and international neoliberal 
economic policy forces the Brazilian national government to 
compete for political legitimacy. Hence, the adoption of the 
neoliberal normative policy agenda by the national government has 
become a domestic political agenda for the country. Due to domestic 
economic instability and the inability of Brazilian institutions to 
address political demand, the national government is forced to align 
with supranational institutions, such as the World Bank, United 
Nations Development Programme (undp), and the Organisation 
for Ecomomic Co-operation and Development (oecd). With this in 
mind, for the Brazilian national government to utilize international 
economic and political resources, the implementation of npm 
policies become a necessity. 
The incorporation of the international economic ideology 
intensifies the national government’s dependency on supranational 
institutions and challenges the state’s existing role as a unifying 
political force in creating policy. Therefore, npm structural policies 
weaken the state’s ability to act as a policy maker, in turn, pressuring 
it to take on the functional role as policy manager. As a result, the 
domestic demand for public policy relevance in the international 
sphere is expressed through institutional competition for a 
decentralized governance structure. Furthermore, by maintaining 
a linear bureaucratic structure, Brazilian subnational governments 
demonstrate the importance of consolidating political autonomy 
and legislative competencies. In addition, the lack of regional 
incorporation of the npm structural method has forced the national 
government to recentralize legislative competencies in an effort to 
portray itself to the international community as legitimate . 
This has led to a political competition between the Brazilian 
state and nonstate actors to control the consolidation of the 
decentralized governmental structure, creating a fragmentation 
between national and subnational policy agendas. The result is 
a new power structure between the political discourse and the 
economic agenda in a normative framework. Within this framework, 
international and domestic governing bodies are created to 
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utilize the national government as a facilitator and, thereby, 
provide its legitimacy to act as “Gatekeeper” in order to balance a 
normative agenda. The dialectical process between centralization 
and decentralization has caused behavioral consequences for 
the “Gatekeeper”, as demonstrated in the direct demand of npm 
and neoliberal policies on the Brazilian state to consolidate and 
maintain political power. To maintain political power, the national 
government as a “Gatekeeper” incorporates a functional approach 
to construct institutional relationships and public policy and, in 
doing so, emphasizes the importance of maintaining legitimacy. 
It also demonstrates the political stagnation that has occurred 
through constitutional reform, and the discontent of citizens with 
political parties. The functional approach allows the “Gatekeeper” 
in Brazil to build consensus within the national government through 
adopting neoliberal and npm policies.
External Pressures on the Brazilian National 
Government in the Reconfiguration of its 
Role as Policy Maker to “Gatekeeper” 
Two factors play a role in defining governance in emerging 
democracies. One is the implementation of an economic, social, 
and development agenda instituted by managerial organizations 
(undp, 1997; World Bank, 1994), which enables the national 
government of Brazil to transfer standardized global norms from 
the international community to the domestic sphere, and, thereby, 
grants itself the power to facilitate international social and economic 
development goals (Rhodes, 1997). The second factor describes 
governance as the sharing of authority in the public management 
of institutional relationships between state and nonstate actors by 
introducing measures such as regulation of relationships, collective 
and operational rules, as well as constitutive choice rules (Jupille & 
Snidal, 2005; Kiser & Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1999). The Brazilian 
state chooses one factor over another based on the level of self-
interest and the access to foreign capital that provides political 
leverage for the national government.
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In the governance structure, these two factors illustrate 
institutional relationships based on multilateral actions rather than a 
single state institution. The development of multilateral relationships 
in the international community is defined by a top-down approach 
and imposes global norms that may not be beneficial to the political 
agenda of the national government. This strategy has created a 
gap in how academics view the effects of administrative policy with 
a neoliberal agenda on the state (Kay & Gwynne, 2000). Ostrom 
(1998) illustrates the positive effectiveness of a pluralistic rule-based 
governance structure as a result of multilateral agreements. On the 
other hand, while multilateralism demonstrates the behavior of 
actors through negotiations, it does not show the effect of policies 
on various governmental sectors and generates ambiguity in political 
discourse (Keohane, Macedo & Moravcsik, 2009; Mansfield & 
Reinhardt, 2003). The transparency of a normative discourse in 
the creation of public policy within a governance structure defines 
political mechanisms through the definition of the “Gatekeeper”. 
It further demonstrates an international structural dimension of 
institutional relationships which forces the national government to 
play the role of “Gatekeeper”. 
Political Science views the traditional role of the national 
government as the centralizing political force in developing and 
implementing the bureaucratic structure. In this process, domestic 
and international governance structures reflect a network of 
institutional relationships based on a normative framework. The 
result is the formation of a cluster of institutional relationships 
into small groups, which construct a political environment based 
on policy outcomes. In this context and regarding international 
cooperation, small groups acting in a governance structure become 
the focal point for the national government (Uzzi, 1997; Uzzi 
& Spiro, 2005). The interaction amongst institutions allows the 
development of institutional relationships regarding norms, shared 
goals, and differentiated roles of members (Harrington & Fine, 
2000). Institutions gather around policy topics that illustrate the 
technical interaction amongst state and nonstate actors. Small group 
networks generate adverse effects by developing group thinking, 
internal and external rivalries, and failure to respond to external 
events (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).
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Therefore, the “Gatekeeper” leads to the institutional political 
strategies of “nesting” and “institutional overlapping”, and has 
an effect on the creation of a normative agenda. To identify 
institutions between a single regime and international agreements, 
the relationships amongst international institutions are in its 
infancy (Young, 2011). Scholarly studies have addressed institutional 
interactions by examining hierarchical and nested regimes that 
analyze the structure of norms and internationals rules embedded 
in a global system (Howse, 2000; Keohane & Nye, 2000; Young, 
2011). International regimes illustrate cooperation as a functional 
approach to discuss issues relating to a regime framework. 
Furthermore, institutional relationships demonstrate the strategic 
nature of policy-making in related fields, which affect the objectives 
of public policy in specific international arenas. Institutional actors 
within institutional relationships incorporate “forum shopping” as a 
litigation strategy to develop regional precedent for legal obligations 
and dispute settlements in multilateral agreements (Mansfield & 
Reinhardt, 2003; Sutherland et al., 2005). This causes both state and 
nonstate actors to seek forums out of political interest. Depending 
on the size and scope of the institution, the degree of forum seeking 
varies, increasing the impact on multiple institutions (Walders & 
Pratt, 2003). The outcome is the evolution of rules and agreements 
within institutional relationships, and explains the variables in 
selection of policy concerns such as barriers to entry to institutional 
relationships and voting rules (Bhagwati & Panagariya, 1996; Davis 
& Bermeo, 2009; Goldstein, Rivers & Tomz, 2007; Neumayer & 
Spess, 2005; Srinivasan, 1998). The differentiation of policy agendas 
of in international and domestic institutions causes the utility of 
the “Gatekeeper” to manage the implementation of economic and 
political regulation. 
This, however, challenges the legitimacy of the Brazilian 
national government as manager of policy agendas (e.g. fiscal 
and regulatory policy), and forces it to prioritize policy when 
multiple institutions overlap (Uzzi, 1997; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). 
This overlapping is the result of supranational factors, such as 
World Bank policies, neoliberal forces, npm, and the Washington 
Consensus, which are the outcome of emerging governance 
structures from the international community. Therefore, external 
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pressure from the governance structure forces the Brazilian national 
government to take on the role as “Gatekeeper”. 
The Evolvement of the Brazilian National 
Government as “Gatekeeper” 
As much as supranational factors execute external pressures 
on the Brazilian state, they also represent institutional tools and, 
as such, the internal conditions leading to the evolvement of the 
role of the national government (Martin & Simmons, 1998). The 
power of the international community to create and implement 
policy through a neoliberal decentralization model has resulted in 
a loss of regulatory power for Brazil’s national government as policy 
maker. Neoliberal economic policy exacerbates regulation, and the 
functional adoption of decentralization in Brazilian federal states 
leads to an administrative fragmentation. The result is neoliberal 
policy expansion through a competitive political discourse between 
domestic actors for greater autonomy in policy implementation. 
This is shown in the State’s Reform Plan (1995) which requires 
competition between public managers and patrimonialism practices 
(República Federativa do Brasil, 1995). However, this competition 
is incompatible with the administrative system4. Hence, the 
differentiation in institutional political discourse leads to greater 
complexity in the political domestic agenda, and represents the 
impact of the institutional process on state and nonstate actors. 
Consequently, the administrative management agenda 
of Brazil’s institutions emerges, and commonalities within the 
federal states lead to interaction between national and subnational 
governments, thus providing greater political legitimacy. The 
main objective of the Brazilian npm model is to produce greater 
efficiency and more accountability in public management, as 
seen in institutional reforms of regulatory, executive, and social 
organizations5. For the bureaucratic state to legitimize its actions 
4 For more information on public management reform and patrimonialism practices, 
see Restrepo-Botero (2000).
5 See Ferreira (1999) and Marconi (1999) for more information on civil service in the 
Brazilian reform process.
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under npm policy, it must develop resource redistribution policies 
to ensure a relationship between governmental elites and society. 
At the point that governmental agencies create an npm policy, 
there is a normative and policy backlash in form of western free 
market pressures that question the domestic political and economic 
environment. In addition, as governmental elites implement 
political reforms and economic incentives, the state is able to 
consolidate information and knowledge through npm policy and 
is now in a structural position to create efficient bureaucratic 
structure. To maintain political stability between governmental 
elites, the “Gatekeeper” develops mechanisms that allow the state 
to maintain its autonomy. Accordingly, this analysis will illustrate 
the development of the “Gatekeeper” as a result of decentralized 
administrative reforms in the market economy. 
The core of the “Gatekeeper’s” legitimacy is the ability to attract 
and direct a stream of information while staying focused on its 
political interest (Metoyer-Duran, 1993). Therefore, the functional 
relevance of policy will be evident where the “Gatekeeper” creates 
political power. Literature states that the political power of the 
“Gatekeeper” is defined by several schools of thought: Positive, 
Weberian, and Pluralist (Foucault, 1978; Lukes, 2005; Weber, 
1947). In explaining the structural nature of institutionalism, this 
analysis is based on a “Positive School” approach that focuses on 
interaction between the “Gatekeeper” and institutions, and the 
subsequent results of indirect mechanisms for interaction (Barzilai-
Nahon, 2008). In this sense, the “Positive School” demonstrates 
how individual interaction with a group provides alternative choices 
for actors within a system. In institutional interaction, the political 
power of actors lies in the consolidation of political discourse 
and in the ability to impose normative definitions on other actors 
(Bache, 1997; Shoemaker, 1991). Institutional political power held 
by state and nonstate actors is two-fold: It focuses on the origins of 
policy discourse by granting one actor the ability to change policy 
discourse over another actor (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Dahl, 1957; 
Polsby, 1963); and it furthers the promotion of institutional interests 
by allowing the “Gatekeeper” to act on decisions with the intent to 
challenge institutional power or impose norms in the interest of 
the “Gatekeeper”. 
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Regulatory reform is accomplished through an administrative 
rule-making structure that exercises legislative desecration through 
the consolidation of and competition for public participation, 
regulatory policy, delegation of legislative powers, and technical 
policy creation (Desposato & Scheiner, 2008). In consequence, 
the evolution of public policy leads to a competing institutional 
relationship between neoliberal and domestic political agendas 
in Brazil. 
State and nonstate actors demand national governments to 
incorporate global ideals through the institutionalization of norms. 
In Brazil, a liberal ideology has promoted the privatization of 
the state for the purposes of efficiency in the use of political and 
economic resources. In the 1980s and 1990s, the institutionalization 
of norms was debated in the Baker Plan launched by the imf and 
the World Bank in order to define neoliberal reform and restructure 
the size of the government. As a result, international actors 
support the idea to sequence the implementation of neoliberal 
policies by starting with a civil service reform agenda before 
public management reforms6. This pressure creates competition 
between actors for political space held by the national government 
as “Gatekeeper”, as seen in the interaction between institutional 
relationships. These relationships are centered on state power and 
depict the national government as an actor to facilitate technology, 
strategies, and governance instruments, depending on their points 
of interest. The incorporation of strategic instruments initiates 
the Brazilian national government to develop universal legitimacy 
for state and nonstate actors in the political community. The 
differentiation of actors has redefined state power and the role of 
the national government.
Brazil’s national and subnational governments have developed 
a domestic policy comprised of international norms and domestic 
political interest that favors the decentralization of governance 
structure. The standardization of npm and neoliberal policy forces 
the Brazilian national government to be a manager rather than a 
creator of domestic and international policy. In this framework, 
6 For more information on sequencing of public management reforms, see Shepherd 
and Valencia (1996).
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the competition between supranational institutions (such as the 
World Bank, oecd, undp) and the “Gatekeeper” for administrative 
political autonomy in national and subnational governments is 
the basis for policy discourse. This competition is brought about 
by the imposition of decentralization policy as spelled out in the 
Washington Consensus. 
The Washington Consensus 
The impact of the Washington Consensus on Brazil is directly 
related to the historical connection of United States military and 
trade interventions in Latin America7. Furthermore, military 
interventions set the path for a favorable political discourse, as well 
as economic opportunities for the Brazilian elite. According to Gore 
(2000), the agenda of the Washington Consensus is to restructure 
political, economic and social institutions, by transforming national 
economies and societies from a developing to a developed status 
through the mobilization and allocation of resources. The policy 
creation of the Washington Consensus is viewed as a “universal 
convergence” toward a macroeconomic discipline (Williamson, 
1999), which is an attempt to summarize the reform agenda in 
Brazil (Williamson, 1993). Therefore, the Washington Consensus 
is interpreted as a paradigm shift to change the framework from 
state-planned economies to free market reforms and, thereby, 
changes the worldview of economic policy (Kuhn, 1970). In 
the 1980s, the “Consensus” was adopted in Brazil’s normative 
framework to implement development processes within national and 
international relationships. 
The normative framework now encourages a mutually 
supporting relationship centered on nationalism, aid policy, and 
historic development issues. Before the implementation of the 
Washington Consensus, Brazilian development policy was formed 
based on structuralist and dependency theories (Kay, 1989), which 
emphasized the importance of external factors on development 
policy and suggested to not solely rely on national development 
7  For an extended discussion on the impact of the Washington Consensus in Latin 
America, see Gore (2000), Grugel et al. (2008), and Williamson (1993).
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processes. For example, “while structuralism argued in favor of 
an inward-directed development policy largely through import-
substituting industrialization (isi), dependency theory proposed 
a new international economic order and, in one of its strands, a 
transition to socialism as a way out of underdevelopment” (Kay 
& Gwynne, 2000, p. 50). Accordingly, the normative economic 
internationalism approach developed in Brazil integrates the 
policies of the Washington Consensus. In normative policies, the 
Liberal International Economic Order (lieo) helps define new 
approaches in development practices (Gilpin, 2001). 
New normative policy approaches consist of a commitment to 
free markets, private property, individual incentive, and government 
involvement (Gore, 2000). These new approaches have evolved 
from a laissez-faire liberalization of external and domestic relations 
into a policy advocating liberalization of external trade and the 
recognition of the legitimacy of state intervention in the case of 
market failures (Gore, 2000). Normative policy is formulated by two 
types of arguments: The intrinsic ethical superiority of economic 
liberalism, and theoretical-empirical analyses which demonstrate 
that conformity to lieo norms would lead to better outcomes (Gore, 
1996). These arguments explain the benefits of liberalization of 
trade and the evolution of macroeconomic policy internationally. 
In this regard, there are two important challenges to the policy 
proposed in the Washington Consensus. The first is presented in the 
Human Development Report (hdr) and the Human Development 
Indicators (hdi) by the undp, which question the free market 
approach in the Washington Consensus (Gore, 1996, 2000). The 
second challenge from the “Southern Consensus” perspective 
highlights the need for underdeveloped regions to undertake 
industrialization and catch up with the developing world (Armijo & 
Faucher, 2010). 
This is prevalent in Brazil’s policy developments towards 
neo-structuralism, in the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), and has been 
further developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (unctad, 2015). These organizational policy 
developments cause friction between institutional actors and the 
Washington Consensus paradigm of normative internationalism and 
methodological nationalism (Gore, 2000), as evident in the top-
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down economic growth strategy of the Washington Consensus led 
by outside experts (Craig & Porter, 2003). At the same time, it is the 
United Nations (un) agenda to introduce a contradictory trade and 
development model around a people-centered approach and equal 
participation between developing and donor countries. In turn, the 
opposition from the un towards the Washington Consensus and its 
implementation by the developing world pressures the World Bank 
to incorporate the amendment of a human development policy into 
the Washington Consensus (McCloskey, 1988; Waelbroeck, 1998). 
Supranational policies imposed on Brazil lead to a fragmented 
state over the perceived negative outcome of public policy on 
society. For this reason, economists conclude that the Washington 
Consensus should be abandoned before the introduction of policy 
shows signs of economic instability in the international communities 
and other Latin American countries. As a result, Brazil has been 
able to change the coercive economic political instruments of 
the Washington Consensus through deliberation of the un. The 
people-centered approach developed by the un has created greater 
pluralism within the international community on economic policy 
(Grugel, Riggirozzi & Thirkell-White, 2008). 
During Latin America’s Peso Crisis in the 1980s, national 
governments in the region “decentralized” institutions by 
incorporating Washington Consensus reforms to combat economic 
and social fallout. This strategy has evolved to an “economic 
liberalization coupled with formal liberal democracy” (Harriss, 
Stokke & Törnquist, 2004). The oecd (1997) states that Latin 
American countries have implemented diverse decentralized policy 
initiatives such as development policy, environmental management, 
welfare, and credit provision. Likewise, decentralization aims 
to empower local governments and civil society by improving 
competition, efficiency, equity, and bureaucratic policy (Manor, 
1999; Samoff, 1990; Schneider, 2003). At the same time, Ribot and 
Larson (2005) illustrate how governmental ministries of central 
governments assign insufficient or inappropriate powers and 
construct policy frameworks that serve their own interests. The 
fundamental aspects of decentralization consist of discretionary 
powers without the presence of accountable representative 
authorities (Almeida, 2006; Ribot & Larson, 2005). Also, the 
main goal of decentralization is the participation of the private 
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sphere in the political discourse (Agrawal, 1998). Within the 
decentralized structure, civil society institutions create pressure by 
developing local democratic institutions to encourage governmental 
institutional compromise (Ribot, 2004). 
The challenge for the national government in introducing 
neoliberal reforms enables regional governments to assert their 
own political legitimacy. Habermas (2006, p. 413) state that 
the “deliberative paradigm offers as its main empirical point of 
reference a democratic process, which is supposed to generate 
legitimacy through a procedure of opinion and will formation that 
grants (a) publicity and transparency for the deliberative process, 
(b) inclusion and equal opportunity for participation, and (c) a 
justified presumption for reasonable outcomes (mainly in the view 
of impact of arguments on rational changes in preference)”. In 
Brazil, national and subnational governmental institutions within 
a multi-level governance structure have formulated a political 
rhetoric connecting the origins of decentralization to the rise 
of democratization (Diamond & Tsalik, 1999; Falleti, 2010). The 
promotion of decentralization in Brazil has been illustrated as 
a historical process, leading to a shift in economic policy, debt 
crises and democratization (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, 2009). The 
implementation of decentralization policies is a direct result of 
national and subnational state structures. This has allowed the 
Washington Consensus to leave lasting effects on the current 
bureaucratic structure and has created an environment that 
promotes further decentralization of policy implementation by the 
national government to adhere to international pressure. 
The Effects of Governmental Structures 
on the Brazilian National Government 
in its Role as “Gatekeeper” 
Since the 1990s, the state has been unsuccessful in leaving behind 
the bureaucratic models of public management due to the focus 
on the relationship between the state and society in a multilevel 
governance structure (e.g. national government, federal state, 
and municipalities) (Abrucio, 2007; Bresser-Pereira, 1998; Matias-
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Pereira, 2010, 2013, 2014). To create more efficiency in the public 
management model, the state has increased the involvement of 
society and has emphasized a decentralized systematic model. The 
decentralized process is evident in the federal constitution, which 
stresses the accountability of the public management model by 
reinforcing the legality of the state through the Public Ministry 
(República Federativa do Brasil, 2014a; Rocha, 2001; Schwartzman, 
1988). Therefore, the decentralization process provided public 
management opportunities to access local municipalities by 
delivering goods and services. At the same time, the state has 
implemented two managerial models, the State’s Reform Plan (1995) 
and the “presidential coalition model”, to create more autonomy for 
the Executive Branch and to allow for the prioritization of policy 
preferences. For example, the prioritization of policy has been based 
on sectoral redistributive policies to give the executive flexibility to 
raise taxes, to use coercive administrative policy for internal order 
and external security, and to manipulate fiscal policy for social and 
economic goals (Klering, de-Campos-Soares-Porsse & Guadagnin, 
2010). The presidential coalition was the model of choice for 
public managers in the Da Silva government, and was continued 
by Dilma Rousseff’s administration to place systemic control over 
the bureaucratic apparatus. The main aim by both administrations 
was to distort administrative reforms and slow down administrative 
modernization (Matias-Pereira, 2013, 2014).
The “Gatekeeper” in the Brazilian government has been able 
to hijack managerial reforms and generate political fragmentation 
in the state by reinforcing institutional consolidation through a 
Brazilian public administration machine (Paes-de-Paula, 2005). This 
has allowed the “Gatekeeper” to create reforms by consolidating 
public services and to gain access to political and economic 
resources. During the Da Silva and Rousseff administrations, the 
state did not create social controls through public management 
but used the market to commoditize public services (Paes-de-aula, 
2005). This, in turn, re-oriented public management by changing 
states’ capacities for national development and creating institutional 
accountability (Cardoso-Jr., 2011).
As services in public management have expanded through the 
orientation brought on by market pressures, the “Gatekeeper” has 
been able to create a winning coalition through a patrimonialism 
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model that has expanded through the administrative machine 
(e.g. creation of ministries, secretaries, state-run companies, etc.), 
political party support and strategic political interests of ministries, 
in order to maintain the winning coalition of the executive. This 
allows the public management to be co-opted by special interests and 
allows the governmental elites in the coalition to transfer economic 
and political gains to its members (Matias-Pereira, 2013, 2014). 
The Brazilian national government in its regional and 
international politics has become an actor with limited capability to 
push its domestic policy agenda due to administrative and economic 
constraints. Actions of the Executive Branch have not challenged 
the restricted role of Brazil in the domestic arena. Thus, its role has 
become that of a “Gatekeeper”, who is in charge of consolidating 
the political power through administrative and economic reforms, 
by giving domestic actors access to political and economic resources 
and meeting international economic growth expectations. 
The “Gatekeeper” framework allows the Executive Branch and 
governmental elites to maintain a state-centric approach by focusing 
on the status quo.
In da Silva and Rousseff administrations, the “Gatekeeper” 
played a functional role in the centralization of political power 
through access to capital for governmental elites, thereby affecting 
political outcomes. The impact of administrative decentralization in 
Brazil has led to the adoption of the neoliberal policy mechanism 
known as npm. The shift from administrative centralization to 
decentralization enables a legislative body to create legislative 
mechanisms. In addition, the back-and-forth process between 
centralized and decentralized structures highlights where political 
relationships and when institutional policy processes occur. The 
changing role of the national government in Brazil is the result of 
the shift from centralization to decentralization and the change in 
perception of strategic mechanisms in the idea of “actorness”. At the 
same time, the process of decentralization explains the transfer of 
power from the national to the subnational governments due to the 
liberalization of the market.
For example, in the case of the political group Mensalão, 
which was organized by José Dirceu and Marcus Valério, the access 
to public funds was provided for politicians through the transfer 
of money from the Rural Bank of Brazil and some private financial 
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institutions (Press Office of Brazilian Federal Senate, 2005). This 
extraction of capital, made possible through the “Gatekeeper”, 
formed the basis for the Labor Party (pt) under the da Silva 
administration and expressed itself in the institutional interactions 
regarding financing and payments of debts for electoral campaigns. 
To maximize the extraction capability of the “Gatekeeper” during 
the 2002 election, the size of the winning coalition was kept small 
in order to transfer capital to individual governmental elites of the 
following political parties: Liberal Party (pl), Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party (pmdb), Progressive Party (pp), Labor Party (pt), 
and Brazilian Labor Party (ptb). As the governmental elites were 
identified, it became evident that President da Silva was a part of 
the Mensalão case (Press Office of Brazilian Federal Senate, 2005). 
Therefore, the “Gatekeeper” model demonstrates the consolidation 
of power in Brazilian national institutions and has the capability to 
reveal the actions of executives of a political party. Additionally, the 
“Gatekeeper” is able to maintain the coalition over time due to the 
lack of a regulatory framework that enables favoritism of elites. 
The discontent in the Brazilian electorate expressed by 
civil society has pressured the national government toward 
decentralization. The driving force for subnational governments 
to decentralize has been used for illiberal ends, for example, to 
increase its presence in the regional public sector. In consequence, 
the federal structure exacerbates the conflictual relationships 
between subnational governments and the national government 
regarding political power. These conflictual relationships forced the 
Brazilian national government to reassess territorial autonomy and 
to recentralize political authority (Eaton, 2013; Eaton & Dickovick, 
2004; O’Neill, 2003; Wibbels, 2001; Willis, Garman & Haggard, 
1999). As a result of the centralization of political authority, “spill 
over” of policy has consolidated the administrative roles of the 
Executive Branch of government. In this scenario, the npm policy 
reforms have developed a geographical functional approach by 
adopting an Executive Branch model. In the npm policy reform, the 
financial, administrative, and market-based management models 
“spill over” into other policy fields. 
The “spill over” that occurs in the creation of policy adds 
further autonomy to the political authority and its jurisdictions, 
which makes it harder for civil society and unions to challenge 
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or enforce legislative developments made by the elites 
(Eaton, 2013; Eaton & Dickovick, 2004; O’Neill, 2003). The 
“Gatekeeper” insulates governmental elites due to its jurisdictional 
area and the ability to utilize “credit-claiming” and “scapegoating” 
(Moravcsik, 1993). This allows the Brazilian national government 
to divide and fragment differing vested interests in politics. 
The “Gatekeeper” converges policies and relationships around 
administrative obligations in npm policy and, thereby, creates a 
threshold for institutions to act toward administrative regulations. 
Furthermore, the interaction between state and nonstate actors 
within the “Gatekeeper” demonstrates a complex and multi-
structure environment. While state actors develop an economic 
policy that favors a neo-liberal administrative agenda, nonstate 
actors pressure for an agenda set by public interest (e.g. Human 
Rights, environmental, economic, etc.). This, in turn, creates a 
pluralistic and stagnated policy agenda which is subject to a slow-
moving legitimate process. In regards to creating policy change, the 
“Gatekeeper” uses policy strategies to evoke a political agenda.
The “Gatekeeper” focuses on the differentiation of political 
actors with the intention to replicate the structural understanding of 
the political framework throughout all levels of government (Matias-
Pereira, 2010, 2013, 2014). As stated in this review, the policy process 
in a decentralized and centralized structure has a causal relationship 
between multilateral and domestic political origins of governmental 
structures and the implementation of international and domestic 
norms. Furthermore, the relationship between conditionality of 
policy norms and governmental structures highlights the role of 
the national government as a “Gatekeeper”, and the development 
process of structural and institutional factors show how the state 
transforms in a governance framework.
The second example in describing the role of the “Gatekeeper” 
refers to the case of the Pasadena Refining System Inc., where the 
coalition in the “Gatekeeper” was comprised of public employees, 
businessmen, and politicians. To access capital and consolidate 
power, the “Gatekeeper” utilized its access to Petrobras, the Brazilian 
State Owned Enterprise (soe). Under the leadership of President 
Rousseff, the access to capital for governmental and business elites 
gave the coalition the ability to extract capital from Petrobras’ 
administration council in access of US $1.2 billion to purchase 
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Pasadena’s Refinery in Texas, usa, which was owned by the Belgium 
company Astra Oil (República Federativa do Brasil, 2014b). Since 
the asking price for the refinery was only US $42 million, the 
“Gatekeeper” transferred the remaining money to the members of 
the winning coalition (República Federativa do Brasil, 2014b).
Due to its administrative authority and the relationships with 
governmental elites within Petrobras, the “Gatekeeper” has been 
able to consolidate power through political coalitions as well as to 
strengthen the status quo and the political agenda. Based on the 
jurisdiction of administrative authority and the influence of business 
elites in these jurisdictions, a pro-economic agenda has been 
enforced through either Petrobras or the privatization of public 
services (Matias-Pereira, 2005, 2013; República Federativa do Brasil, 
2014b). Administrative capacity has allowed the Executive Branch to 
retain valuable sources of revenue from Petrobras in order to include 
governmental elites in the winning coalition. However, the allocation 
of capital resources from Petrobras has created a dependency on 
these resources, thereby limiting political and economic factors and 
hindering administrative efficiency and the creation of effective 
npm policy. The political and economic limitations form the basis 
for the Executive Branch and central government to utilize the 
“Gatekeeper” for its regulatory capacity, and are documented 
in the institutional interactions regarding budget rigidities and 
fiscal redistribution (Fadul & de-Souza, 2005). As a result, the 
national government increases the capital of Petrobras via political 
institutions, creating dependencies within institutional “Gatekeeper” 
relationships. In consequence, the coalition between the Executive 
Branch, Petrobras, and the winning political party, intensifies 
their relationships due to regulatory noncompliance in a multi-
level governance framework (Matias-Pereira, 2010). Furthermore, 
noncompliance shapes expectations regarding the behavior of other 
actors, allowing self-enforcing norms to be violated (Matias-Pereira, 
2005 and 2013).
It has been the goal of the Brazilian administrative 
bureaucratic decentralization to provide efficiency and reduce 
economic cost by incorporating administrative neoliberal policy 
reforms and deregulation within the nation state. The enactment of 
administrative policy and developments is designed to promote the 
participation of civil societies in the political process. The intent of 
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administrative decentralization is to streamline the decision-making 
process in the development of policy and the consolidation of 
government resources. Therefore, the Brazilian npm policy is aimed 
at increased participation in policy development and economic 
growth by local governments (Matias-Pereira, 2013). The npm policy 
has allocated resources to civil society in the form of public services 
in a free market-based structure.
Due to the inability to affect meaningful societal change in 
Brazil, there has been a shift in the international arena regarding 
administrative and economic policy in the state towards the 
implementation of institutional political preferences (Easterly, 2005). 
Inasmuch as the institutional political preferences created by the 
international community demonstrate the evolution of the Brazilian 
national government from a policy maker to a policy manager, the 
author of this review also considers the Washington Consensus to 
be an important external force in the changing role of the Brazilian 
national government.
The two examples of the “Gatekeeper” demonstrate its presence 
in the bureaucracy of Brazil’s public administration through the 
consolidation of political power. Consequently, the “Gatekeeper” 
influences the administrative order through the decentralization of 
npm, and by leveraging legislative amendments as an exchange for 
political support. To conclude, the Brazilian public administration 
has been influenced by patrimonialism and inefficiency, thus 
exacerbating fragility and distortions in the functioning of the 
Brazilian bureaucratic model. The ability of the “Gatekeeper” 
to insulate its actions in the monopolization of the governing 
coalition and to access capital enhances the distortion of its actions 
in the bureaucratic system, providing the ideal political space to 
maintain power.
Conclusions 
In the Brazilian context, multi-level governance will prevail as a 
dominant framework to address institutional relationships in a 
hierarchical structure. Both multi-level governance structures, 
international organizations and Brazil, produce emerging 
relationships between actors and policy cooperation. In the 
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dynamics of these relationships it is the role of the “Gatekeeper” to 
control the process of policy-making in the national government, 
which, in turn, legitimizes the power of the “Gatekeeper” in 
interactions between subnational governments and international 
organizations. As such, the national government acts as a stopgap in 
the formulation of policy and maintenance of the status quo.
Within multi-level governance, the implementation of 
neoliberal policy goes hand-in-hand with a normative understanding 
of the effects of administrative reform on society. As shown in 
the case of npm, pressure from the World Bank and the imf to 
implement institutional decentralization creates a conflictual 
relationship between the centralizing forces of the state and the 
decentralizing forces of international institutions. This causes 
a conflict between traditional agendas of nation states and the 
consolidation of power in a centralized framework and forces the 
process of decentralization (Keohane & Victor, 2010; Young, 2011). 
Pressure by the World Bank, oecd, undp, and imf to decentralize 
administrative reform and privatize industry, has allowed these 
institutions to impose neoliberal policies on Brazil. Throughout 
Brazil’s administrative history, the national government has 
incorporated a dialectical approach toward centralized and 
decentralized political structures depending on the levels of demand 
from subnational governments and international organizations 
for reform. Historically, the Brazilian government has developed 
state-run industries that are partially public in centralized as well 
as decentralized political structures. In both structures, it has been 
the policy of the Brazilian national government to consolidate npm 
reform and to promote an economic and administrative neoliberal 
agenda in favor of private business and elites.
The promotion of private business and elites as an 
administrative agenda creates political competition and establishes 
the role for the Brazilian national government as “Gatekeeper”. The 
national government has been in competition for political legitimacy 
with domestic and international actors. As a result, it has been 
forced to take on the role as “Gatekeeper” to ensure its legitimacy as 
a political actor. Scholars have introduced the “Gatekeeper” theory 
to explain focal points of societal change in various academic fields 
around a single entity (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Putterman, 2005; 
Suchman & Cahill, 1996; Tushman & Katz, 1980).
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 The “Gatekeeper” model developed by Moravcsik (1993) 
and Pollack (1995) defines political power between state and 
nonstate actors in relation to the “Gatekeeper” and alternative 
strategic relationships of “gatekeeping”. This review expands on 
this theory by explaining the evolution and other political factors 
in the “Gatekeeper” and its institutional relationships. Domestic 
upheaval from civil society and multilateral policy pressure 
from the international community question Brazil’s traditional 
governmental responsibility as a facilitator of democratic norms and 
national sovereignty. The role of the Brazilian national government 
as “Gatekeeper” is characterized as the focal point between 
international and domestic institutions. 
The national government in its role as “Gatekeeper” not 
only ensures to maintain its own power through a centralized 
organization, but also to hold on to political autonomy with the goal 
to implement national preference. This access to power emphasizes 
the impact that the national government has on npm policy. As 
stated throughout this review, power is the ability of an actor to force 
other actors to change their behavior and position to carry out the 
actor’s own will despite resistance (Bendix, 1962; Freund, 1969). 
The outcome of such event is a political shift in power, which has 
changed the dynamics in npm policy reform and the implementation 
toward further emphasis on economic sustainability priorities as 
they relate to the political economy interconnectedness between 
the international community and Brazil. A competitive political 
environment is created between international institutions to expand 
on regulatory legislation by reaching out to other state and nonstate 
actors such as international organizations and domestic institutions. 
This, in turn, leads to a pluralistic and stagnated neoliberal 
policy agenda, which is subject to a slow-moving legitimate 
process. Institutional strategies (i.e. “nesting” and “institutional 
overlapping”) produce fragmented policy developments around 
institutional interests which exacerbate legislative loopholes and 
weak agreements. A pluralistic legal environment pressures the 
“Gatekeeper” to take on the role of policy manager between 
international and domestic interests. 
Due to the decentralized agenda of neoliberal policy, the 
federalist structure has the institutional power to maintain its 
political resilience. The strengthening of federalism is a result of the 
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dialectical process between governors and the national government 
over public policy. This back and forth political discussion between 
institutions and the national government on the federal level 
allows politicians to leverage their states’ agenda for international 
resources through the national government. On the national level, 
the government consolidates power by giving federal states access to 
the “Gatekeeper” with the aim to help politicians and the business 
elite gain political and economic resources.
Institutional relationships between the national government 
and state as well as nonstate actors explain their interactions 
regarding policy development and the standardization of legislative 
policy. The new trend in Political Science and International 
Relations is to focus on the dynamics that connect actors around 
a single policy field and to not emphasize a state-centric approach. 
Also, in drawing a connection between civil society and state 
actors, the international arena and multi-national companies have 
developed mechanisms and roles to navigate a pluralistic political 
structure. To demonstrate further the dynamic relationship between 
nonstate and state actors regarding a normative framework, agendas 
for a structural framework in the developing world and studies on 
the structural relationship between multi-national nonstate and state 
actors have to be expanded on further. 
The descriptive approach of multi-level governance in 
Political Science literature allows political scientists to understand 
political networks, legal jurisdictions, and political autonomy of 
the state. To perceive the relationship between power and the 
national government in a multi-level governance structure, it will 
be important for Political Science literature to expand on the 
analytical mechanisms that are at the foundation of relationships 
between institutions. This will allow political scientists to better 
recognize the state’s role in a multi-level governance structure and 
the role of institutions in the structure. It will also shed light on how 
business elites, government officials, labor unions, and civil society 
manipulate political and economic resources for their own gain.
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